Ukrainian hackers of the team conducted a multi-level CYBINT operation, during which they obtained more than 100 GB of information and closed data of the Russian limited liability company "ALBATROS"
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Learn about the new details of the Russian secret project “Alabuga”. The article reveals and analyzes classified data about a development that poses a significant military threat.
We previously discovered the connection between Albatross and Kaspersky Lab. The latter limited themselves to a rather vague statement, in which they said that Kaspersky stopped cooperation with “Albatross” on the Kaspersky Antidrone program as early as 2022. However, this is not true, because InformNapalm has at its disposal the internal documentation of “Albatross”, where this company tried to deliver an anti-drone system to Kazakhstan in 2022-2023 under a contract with TOO “ComPortal”. The supply contract itself was concluded in the summer of 2022, but due to additional restrictions imposed by the Russian authorities on the export of dual-purpose goods in connection with the war, Albatros took a long time to obtain permission from the export service.
A reasonable question arises: “Kaspersky Laboratory” did not know that its partners continue to introduce products for joint work. And the anti-virus software manufacturer did not know that Albatross had been converted from an agrodron manufacturer to a contractor for the Russian Armed Forces, Albatross, in a letter to customers about obtaining all permits, which indicated an estimated delivery date of 2023/4, dated 3/1 of last year. At least, according to information from open sources, “Kaspersky Laboratory” should have understood that in 2023/1 “Albatross” will become a resident of “Alabuga” and will produce drones for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Here it is worth mentioning that the key element in the anti-drone system is the lidar. The Russians used Opal lidars from the Canadian company Neptec Technologies, which since 2020 is part of the French group Lumibird Limited. Here are the components of the Kaspersky Antidrone system and their cost.
And here is the certificate of the end user, to whom, as early as 2020, “Albatross” guaranteed Lumibird not to transfer or re-export the device to third countries, not to use it for military purposes or in the interests of the Russian government, not to use it for any other purposes, except for the protection of civilian objects.
But as of 2023-2023, when “Albatross” was trying to get all the permits to export anti-drones to Kazakhstan, “Albatross” had already become a manufacturer of weapons and equipment for the Russian Federation. That is, all obligations are violated.
However, “Kaspersky Laboratory” in no way interfered in the foreign economic activity of “Albatross”. Therefore, it can be assumed that the cooperation did not end there.
More and more information about the Albatross’ involvement in the war can be observed in the public domain. However, we are interested in more closed documentation.
Russia started a war with Ukraine in 2014, and the sanctions imposed against the aggressors for the annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas did not hinder the development of Russian industry. Albatross was founded in 2017 and its flagship was the airfoil unmanned aerial vehicle. “Albatross-M5”. Before the start of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, you can observe the following dynamics of the development of “albatross”:
2018 year. UAV “Albatros-M5”: 4 units were produced, 2 of them were sold, 2 are used for providing services.
2019 year. UAV “Albatros-M5”: 5 units were produced, 1 of them was sold, 3 are used for providing services, 1 pc. in stock.
2020 is the year. UAV “Albatros-M5”: 6 units were produced, 4 of them were sold, 2 are used for providing services.
2021 year. UAV “Albatros-M5”: 30 units were produced, 6 of them were sold, 19 are used for providing services, 5 pcs. in stock.
The dynamics of development are obvious. While developing the Albatros-M5 as a civilian drone, during this time the company has grown a client base of at least 60 Russian companies and launched an anti-drone project with Kaspersky. In their reports, it is noted that as of the end of 2021, there were foreign sales of the anti-drone system to Germany, Greece and Switzerland.
For investors, Albatros pointed out that it is cheaper to buy foreign components due to the availability of Western elements for the assembly of devices. So, the elemental base for electronic circuits was manufactured in Malaysia, Korea, Japan and China. Servo drives manufactured by Savox (Sweden-China). Scorpion Engines (US-China). Radio channels (except Russian and our own) produced by RFDesign (Australia). Engine regulators (except for Russian and our own) manufactured by Scorpion (USA-China), Hobbyking (China). Propeller blades manufactured by Aeronaut (Germany). Other components in the Albatros-M5 UAV were manufactured by Malaysia, China, Korea, Singapore, Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland. This was the picture at the end of 2021 – before the full-scale invasion of Russia.
They used raw materials produced in Russia and Germany. As of the beginning of 2022, “Albatross” has fully established the transition of Russian production to raw materials, but the cost of production is increasing due to the high purchase price of such raw materials. That is why German-made carbon was still used as a filler for sandwiches.
The absence of decisive anti-Russian sanctions led to the fact that the Russian company developed successfully. In the “albatross shower” we see how the Russians are trying to sell their products to Egypt, India, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Tanzania and Myanmar. We will talk about the latter later. Obviously, it was only a matter of time before the Albatross Agrodron became a military drone.
At the end of 2022, “Albatross” is preparing to become a resident of SEZ “Alabuga”. The company signed an agreement with LLC “Alabuga Development” on the supply in 2023 of 100 unmanned aerial vehicles “Albatros-M5” in the amount of 10,400 million rubles. According to the technical specifications, 50 drones should be able to work “during the day” and 50 – “at night”, that is, at night.
Full text of the contract: 28_12_Supply_Contract_128_2022_Albatross-1[DOCX]
Also, from the internal documentation of “Albatross” it is clearly visible that their director Florov and chief engineer Spiridonov visited Iran in November 2022.
Another evidence of the direct participation of “Albatross” in the war is an interesting letter from Director Frolov to the head of the Institute of Traffic Technologies and Control Systems of the Russian Jiaotong University, dated March 1, 2023-10-17. In it, Frolov writes that from 2022-2028, Spiridonov provided support to the Russian Federation in the area of so-called special military operations on behalf of Albatros LLC. Therefore, the chief engineer of “Albatross” will not be able to configure the session and will be forced to postpone it.
Although Albatros does not publicly advertise its active involvement in the war, they are methodically updating their “military” presentation of the Albatros-M5. The full presentation is available at the following link: Albatross_M5_War_23 [PPTX].
It is obvious that during 2022-2023, “Albatross-M5” was tested in the combat zone. The geography of application was quite extensive and extended along the entire front.
Drones were mainly used for the purposes and interests of the border service of the FSB, special operations forces of the Russian Federation and the Russian Guard (Sudoplatov battalion).
For example, the Belgorod region is listed in the last item of the test list. And this is an infographic from the Russian propaganda media Mash, which clearly demonstrated the operation of the Albatros-m2023-11, showing the flight routes of drones and comparing the resistance of direct competitors Albatros ZALA and Supercam to electronic warfare.
Flight statistics are undeniable – not only Spiridonov, but also other “Albatross” specialists take a direct part in combat operations. At the same time, in the flight as part of experimental work, artillery adjustment prevailed over reconnaissance.
In other Albatros presentations, you can see a video of how the Albatros-M5 adjusts the gun to defeat the Ukrainian m-777how gun.
Sony cameras will help you take aerial photos and adjust the Albatross cannon. These are usually Sony A6000 and Sony RX1R2 models for still photography, and Sony FCB–EH6500 and Sony FCB-EV7500 cameras for video recording. In addition, Albatros independently manufactures gyro-stabilized suspensions for unmanned aerial vehicles based on these devices, including for night video recording using thermal imagers. These pendants are available for purchase on their website.
Albatross LLC has been cooperating with the Ministry of Defense of Myanmar since 2020. Correspondence with Myanmar makes it clear that the “Albatross-M5” was considered a military drone long before the invasion. This is a draft letter that “Albatross” sent to Myanmar in 2020-2011.
The last paragraph needs to be quoted: “We believe it is unnecessary to explain that our products are dual-use (military and civilian) products, but our cooperation with the armed forces is not to be disclosed. This is the main reason why we do not provide detailed information and do not publish this data on our alb.aero website. At the same time, we emphasize the civil sector and actively develop in this direction, demonstrating success in our media. But we ask you not to doubt that our devices are also used for military tasks, including combat (border protection).”
Alliance Engineering Services Co., Ltd. acted as Albatross’ counterparty in this relationship, but it acted in the interests of the Ministry of Defense. The drones were not to be sold by Albatros directly, but by the intermediary Simplex LLC. There is no information on sanctions against this company.
When planning cooperation, the Burmese explicitly stated that their military plans to have one UAV unit per battalion. “Thus, we will need up to 200-300 UAVs with a service center and manufacturing facilities in Myanmar,” the letter [PDF] states.
At the end of 2021, Albatross demonstrated to investors that in 2022 it included its products in the plan for the purchase of 10 Albatross-m5 complexes by the Ministry of Defense of Myanmar. In the summer of 2022, Frolov wrote a letter to the Burmese with a proposal to continue and expand cooperation. “At the moment, our unmanned aerial complex “Albatross” is being successfully used in combat operations during special military operations on the territory of Ukraine”, – with these words, among other things, Frolov motivated the Burmese to expand “cordial relations” between Russia and Myanmar.
Quite interesting facts from the history of corruption in Russia. In preparation for the sale in Myanmar, Albatross conducted two parallel cost calculations – an external, “official” one seen by contractors, and an internal one for its own plans. So, the internal calculation included the clause that, in fact, “contribution to Oleksandr” – the interest to the intermediary amounts to 24 million dollars. And also the item “increase for further discounts” in the amount of 121 thousand dollars. This is such a warm friendship.
As of early 2024, Albatross still hopes to enter the Myanmar market. This is a letter from the same Oleksandr Dudov, who wants to receive his 4 million dollars for 100 minutes in “commissions”.
Also, as of this year, “Albatross” has another epic going on with entering the market of the United Arab Emirates. Alexander also helps there. The entire correspondence can be found here: Project UAE [PDF]. But we couldn’t help but be interested in the fact that in the correspondence regarding the price and possibility of importing UAVs to the UAE, Albatross employee Mikhail Goldberg indicates that “Albatross M5 was tested in Burkina Faso for 1 month. This event was organized by a private military company. We cannot provide any other data on this matter.”
It is characteristic that in other documentation of “Albatross” you can find information about a so-called “Beryozovaya dolina” LLC. In the business plan of “Albatross” opposite this “Birch Valley” there was a note – “Africa”. Also, this company was involved in the supply of the Kaspersky Antidrone system to Kazakhstan. Whether there is a connection with the Wagner group is a question that needs to be answered.
Albatross uses Nvidia Jetson series microcomputers for neural network-based pattern recognition.
From Florov’s email, you can see that communication and collaboration with Nvidia has been going on since at least 2016. It did not stop either after the invasion, or after sanctions against the Russian Federation, or after direct US sanctions against Albatros LLC. Florova’s contact person is Anton Joraev, senior manager of corporate business development at Nvidia Corporation. For example, in the latest letter from 2024-2026, Albatross is invited to participate in the NVIDIA GTC1 World Conference on Artificial Intelligence in 2024. At the end of the letter Joraev wrote: “invitations can be sent to students and interested colleagues.” It is clear that by student is meant a student of the Alabuga Polytechnic Institute. Therefore, Anton Joraev knows very well what Albatros LLC and Alabuga SEZ are and what they all do.
Another interesting letter to Florov from the accountant of “Alabuga”, dated 2023-11-24, shows that the Russians still use the internal combustion engines of the Japanese manufacturer Saito.1 earlier these engines were discovered in the Russian Orlan-10uav aircraft. How did these engines get to the warehouse in Alabuga and for what purpose was the Saito FG-40 engine transferred to Florov, who is signed as the “chief designer of Alabuga”, perhaps it is still a “pre-war” sample. But in our first review, we wrote that the Russians are trying to establish their own production of engines in Arabza. Maybe this is a sample that copies Saito’s engine.
Also, various supplier companies constantly write to Florova with proposals for cooperation. Most of them are not even ashamed to say openly that they import sanctioned products. For example, the Russian LLC “Atlant” represents the interests of Asia Semiconductor. Their letters indicate that Asia Semiconductor combines Shanghai Chenheyi Technology Development Co. Ltd and Beijing Online Technology Group Co. Ltd.
Asia Semiconductor specializes in the supply of power connectors, transistors, resistors, diodes, microcircuits and other parts and consumables for highly specialized industries.
They are frank and straightforward: “We supply products of well-known companies, including those on the sanctions lists: Mean Well, Aimtec, Siemens, Chinfa, Maxim, XILINX, Atmel, Wago, Vicor, ST/TI and others.
…
We work both with state and defense enterprises and with private productions (turnkey, with VAT, delivery and customs clearance). We draw up the state customs declaration for the import of our products, guaranteeing the receipt of orders on time with the resolution of all customs tasks.
We control the entire cycle of delivery of orders in Russia and the CIS countries.
…
The delivery time to our warehouse in Russia is 4-6 weeks.”
In the attached list of products available at the warehouse of Asia Semiconductor, you can see components produced by global giants Intel, Fujitsu and Siemens. The document can be viewed here: Copy Warehouse in China 13112023 [XLSX].
This is how the albatross works. Sanctions against Russia before the invasion did not affect the development of the military-industrial complex, but sanctions after the invasion were avoided with the help of intermediaries. But Russia continues to kill Ukrainians, destroy our cities and plans to do so for a very long time. How can I stop this? Provide Ukraine with weapons, financial support, apply asymmetric hybrid measures against Russia, revise the sanctions policy and put pressure on the supply of equipment to China and Russia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, etc.).
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