North Korea is actively supplying ballistic missiles to Russia, which are used to attack Ukraine. The study reveals the details of this process: from transportation routes to storage locations in the Russian Federation. It also analyzes the impact of international sanctions on cooperation between the DPRK and Russia.
North Korean Missile Attacks on Ukraine
One of the first confirmed cases of the use of ballistic missiles received by Russia from the DPRK occurred on December 30, 2023. As a result of the attack, at least 24 civilians were killed and more than 100 people were seriously injured. In total, 16 North Korean missiles were fired at the territory of Ukraine that day, hitting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk region and Zaporizhia.
Before that, in early December, the US government announced the possible transfer of such weapons to Russia. According to preliminary data, the first delivery of ballistic missiles could take place in November 2023. In addition, subsequent reports mentioned the recorded deliveries of artillery ammunition to the Russian Federation by sea in the period from December 21 to 25, 2023.
Photo of the debris of a missile that was shot down on December 30, 2023.
The SBU telegram already wrote on February 22, 2024, that it had found confirmation of Russia’s use of DPRK missiles. In particular, it refers to North Korean Hwasong-11 (KN-23/24) ballistic missiles.
On December 20, 2024, the Church of St. Nicholas in Kyiv was damaged.
On the morning of December 20, 2024, Russia launched a ballistic missile strike on Kyiv. The attack killed one person and injured 10 others. The capital’s heating system and St. Nicholas Church were damaged. At the same time, Russian forces struck infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kyiv, and Kharkiv regions.
Consequences of the Russian attack in Kyiv, December 20, 2024
KN-23 missile strike on Kharkiv region on September 2, 2024: consequences and details
On the night of September 2, 2024, Russia launched a combined missile strike on the territory of Ukraine. Among the weapons used were 16 missiles received from the DPRK, one of which hit Kharkiv.
The nature of the attack was reminiscent of the shelling of Kyiv on July 8, 2024, when a Russian missile hit the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital. In total, air defense forces destroyed 22 missiles and 20 Shahed attack drones that day.
Between December 30, 2023 and December 25, 2024, Russia recorded 32 cases of use of North Korean-made ballistic missiles, including the KN-101, KN-102, and KN-103 models. In total, from 101 to 103 such missiles were used. This data is based on open reports from the Air Force and the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine.
What is known about North Korea’s missile tests?
North Korea supplies weapons to Russia through various routes—sea, air, and rail. In early 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on a number of Russian facilities involved in weapons transportation and testing.
In particular, the sanctions covered:
The 224th Flight Unit is a state-owned cargo transportation company owned by the Russian Ministry of Defense. In 2022, sanctions were imposed on 41 aircraft of this organization. In November and December 2023, individual aircraft (RF-86898, RF-78757, RF-82011 and RF-82041) were used to transport ballistic missiles. Sanctions were also imposed on the director of the unit, Vladimir Mikheichyk. The probable base is Chkalovsky Airfield in the Moscow Region.
The Flight Test Center in Vladimirovka, Astrakhan Region, is a facility involved in testing ballistic missiles that were likely developed by North Korea. Its location has been confirmed by satellite imagery.
The Ashuluk combat training ground, Astrakhan region (“185th Center for Combat Application and Combat Purpose of the Aerospace Forces”) is a site used for missile testing and training of the Russian Aerospace Forces. The training ground also has an airfield that provides transportation of equipment and weapons.
Weapons supply routes from North Korea to Russia: ports, ships, railway
Sea freight is carried out from the North Korean port of Rajin to Russian ports in Primorsky Krai.
The distance from the port of Rajin in the DPRK to ports in the Russian Federation is approximately 216 km.
Sea shipments of weapons from North Korea to Russia are made from the port of Rajin / Rason / Najin / 라진구역, DPRK. Russia receives these shipments at two ports:
Konyushkova Bay
Konyushkova Bay is a small port area near Vladivostok, located near a railway line and the DalRAO military enterprise, which is engaged in the disposal of radioactive waste and has a laboratory that studies nuclear energy.
Between mid-August and October 14, 2023, the cargo ships Angara (IMO 9179842) and Maria (IMO 8517839) were recorded moving between ports without active transponders. They were transporting artillery ammunition to an arsenal in Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar Krai.
According to South Korea, starting in November 2023, this route could also have transported ballistic missiles from the DPRK.
From late December 2023 to early February 2024, there was no activity recorded for ships unloading at the port of Danube, according to research by the analytical platform Beyond Parallel.
Eastern Port
The Eastern Port is the largest port in the Russian Far East, located 40 km from Vladivostok. Its main activity is related to the export of coal, oil products and other cargoes. In 2023, its cargo turnover amounted to 86 million tons.
A terminal for receiving civilian cargo is located in Wrangel Bay. Between October 2023 and February 2024, 19 ships were recorded entering the port without transponder signals.
On February 22, 2024, British intelligence recorded the ship MAIA 1 (IMO 9358010) in the port with a switched off signal, which transported cargoes from the North Korean port of Rajin. Three more ships, also operating without a signal, remain unconfirmed.
A total of four ships have been identified involved in the transportation of ammunition from the DPRK to Russia. According to the publication “Word and Deed”, these ships were transporting artillery ammunition, and it is likely that the same route is used to deliver ballistic missiles..
Where in Russia are North Korean missiles stored?
Russia has several storage sites for ammunition and missiles obtained from North Korea. One of the key sites is the Tikhoretsk depot in Krasnodar Krai.
Tikhoretsk is one of the three largest ammunition storage sites in Russia and performs an important logistical function. On September 18, 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine struck this depot as another shipment of North Korean missiles arrived. The strike caused the detonation of ammunition at the site.
Russia is home to several key storage and testing sites for missiles obtained from North Korea.
Ammunition depots
Mozdok, North Ossetia – An important ammunition depot is located near the city. Mozdok is also home to an airbase that has been used to launch missile strikes on Ukraine since 2023.
Yegorlyk Airfield, Rostov Oblast – Located 3 km from the village of Yegorlykskaya and 35 km from the city of Zernograd. It may also store missiles and ammunition.
– base of the 185th Center for Combat Application and Combat Purpose of the Aerospace Forces, which is used for missile testing and training military pilots.
Russia and North Korea have established close cooperation, creating infrastructure for storing, testing, and transporting missiles on a large scale.
What missiles did the Russian Federation receive from the DPRK?
North Korea, despite international sanctions, has managed to create a large arsenal of missiles. Most of them are modified versions of Soviet or Chinese models. For example, the Scud missiles are an adaptation of Soviet complexes, and some models are similar to the Iskander-M or Smerch.
One of the key production facilities of the DPRK is considered to be the February 11 plant, but the country also has other enterprises capable of producing and modernizing ballistic missiles.
Location of the February 11th plant in North Korea
North Korea continues to develop missile technology despite international sanctions. Among its most powerful weapons are the KN-23 missile, capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 800 km, carrying a warhead weighing 500 kg, and the KN-25, a hybrid of an MLRS and a tactical missile with a range of 380 km.
The navigation systems for these missiles often contain imported components, despite sanctions, including from the United States, Taiwan, Germany, Singapore, Japan, Switzerland, China and the Netherlands. Approximately 75% of the chips found in North Korean missiles were manufactured between 2021 and 2023, confirming the fact that the latest technology is being supplied to circumvent restrictions.
The KN-23 missile modification, also known as the 9K720 Iskander-M or Hwasong-11A, is an adapted version of the Russian Iskander-M, which was developed in 1999 and adopted for service in 2006. This model appeared in the DPRK in 2018, and its tests took place in 2019.
According to the Hague Code of Conduct on Non-Proliferation of Missile Technology, solid-fuel engines for the KN-23 and KN-24 are likely produced at the No. 17 Explosives Plant in Hamgyong Province, as well as at the February 11 Plant, which is confirmed by CAR research.
According to an estimate by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, one nuclear modification of the Hwasong-11s costs about $5 million. During the test period, the DPRK launched at least 120 KN-23 or KN-24 missiles, demonstrating the scale of development and active buildup of missile capabilities.
Chronology of cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation
As of February 3, 2024, The New York Times reported that North Korean troops had withdrawn from the contact line in the Kursk region. The likely reason for this decision was significant losses among the DPRK military.
In November 2024, 11,000 North Korean soldiers arrived in Russia, but within three months their number had halved, as stated by the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrsky.
As of January 28, 2024, 12,000 North Korean soldiers were stationed on the territory of Russia, in particular in the Kursk region. According to mid-January data, losses among the North Korean military amounted to about 4,000 people, of whom approximately 1,000 were killed, and the rest were wounded, missing or captured.
On January 28, 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine officially reported the capture of two North Korean servicemen in the Kursk region.
Despite significant losses, cooperation between Russia and the DPRK continues to expand, especially after the strengthening of international sanctions in 2022. The interaction between these countries is based on the exchange of resources, weapons and diplomatic support, which has turned them into “brotherly nations” in the military-political aspect.
On February 27, 2024, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik stated that North Korean munitions factories are operating at full capacity in exchange for food and raw materials supplied by Russia.
The Korean-Russian Friendship Bridge. The only bridge across the Tumangan River, the border between the Russian Federation and the DPRK. Below is a photo of how it looks as of 2023
The supply of artillery, ballistic missiles and other weapons from the DPRK to Russia is just one aspect of their cooperation. After the start of the full-scale invasion, the Russian Federation first established contacts with North Korea through its puppets – the so-called “L/DPR”.
In May 2022, a meeting of the “foreign ministers” of these entities, Natalia Nikonorova and Vladislav Deinego, with the DPRK ambassador to Russia, Shin Hong-chol, took place in Moscow. Within two months, North Korea officially recognized the “DPR”. For the first time, information about Russia’s purchase of weapons from the DPRK appeared on September 6 of the same year.
In early 2023, it became known that the DPRK planned to send 300-500 people to the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Large-scale arms supplies intensified after the visit to North Korea of former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
In total, between April 1, 2022 and November 29, 2024, 161 cases of arms supplies and 47 official meetings between representatives of both countries were recorded.
According to open data, analysts also found that during this time Russia supplied oil to the DPRK 19 times, which indicates close economic interaction against the backdrop of international sanctions.
Since 2022, there has been a gradual strengthening of cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation.
The transfer of oil from Russia to the DPRK, which is an important part of their economic cooperation, is separately marked.
Diplomatic gestures and symbolic exchanges of gifts are also recorded. One example is the transfer of a special train with valuable gifts by Vladimir Putin to Kim Jong-un.
In parallel, rail communication between the countries was restored via the “Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge”, which contributes to the further development of cooperation.
This is what the “Korean-Russian Friendship Bridge” looks like. Source — google photo
The use of KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles despite international sanctions demonstrates a high level of military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK. These countries have well-established logistics, use sea routes and railways, and also test missiles at Russian test sites. In addition to supplying weapons, the DPRK has sent its military to support the Russian Federation. It is obvious that cooperation between the two dictatorial regimes will only intensify.
From December 30, 2023 to February 22, 2024, Russia used at least 20-24 North Korean ballistic missiles. The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine stated that they examined the fragments of 21 of the approximately 50 missiles used against Ukraine.
In the period October-November 2024, the supply of another 100 short-range ballistic missiles of the KN-23/24 type was recorded.
From December 2023 to December 31, 2024, the use of at least 101 DPRK-made missiles against Ukraine was officially confirmed.
The article examines the rocket attack on the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in Kyiv, which occurred on July 8, 2024. Using data from open sources, it was determined that the missile that struck the hospital was a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile, disproving claims that it was of American origin.
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