We analyze how Russia creates and uses a shadow fleet to transport oil to Europe, avoiding sanctions and supporting the economy under international pressure. The article details the methods used to conceal the true origin of the oil, including forging documents and changing the flags of vessels. This study offers an in-depth look at the dark side of the global oil trade.
In recent years, the Gulf of Laconia in Greece has become the center of large-scale oil transshipment operations between ships (Ship-to-Ship, STS), which has allowed Russia to circumvent international sanctions. Here, in a quiet and picturesque bay, dozens of old oil tankers were used for illegal transportation of oil, hiding its origin. These operations helped provide the Kremlin with funds used to finance aggression against other countries.
The Greek authorities seemed to turn a blind eye to these violations, actively supporting the activities of the Russian shadow fleet. Over the past two years, Laconian Bay has turned into a safe haven for such operations. Especially in recent months, the number of STS operations has increased dramatically, reaching a peak in early May.
Recently, however, the Greek government, under pressure from the international community, finally took action to stop the illegal oil trade. The Greek Navy implemented the NAVTEX system, which helped clear the Laconian Gulf of oil-smuggling tankers. This is a significant step forward, but many believe that these measures should have been taken earlier to prevent illicit proceeds from being used to finance military operations.
Despite the progress made, the question remains: Will this end to the illegal oil trade last, and will Greece continue to adhere to its new standards? After all, the Kremlin has already managed to take advantage of the situation to finance its aggressive policy.
Can Russia afford a war in Ukraine? Some economists believe that Putin is in a difficult position: he cannot afford to win or lose. Reconstruction of Ukraine will be too expensive, they claim. However, in order to wage an aggressive war and maintain high military spending — while at the same time giving the impression that the economy is growing with GDP growth of several percent — Putin needs to sell oil. This oil finances arms purchases and supplies the defense industry with materials and workers, perpetuating a deadly cycle that the Kremlin supports with pernicious indifference.
Under strict EU sanctions, this process of selling oil becomes an even more difficult challenge. Instead of acting openly, Russia switched to “dark” and covert methods. Russia’s largest state-owned oil companies still manage to continue selling oil. In February, Russia’s monthly income from fossil fuel exports increased again. So, the situation for the Kremlin looks quite positive, despite the EU’s attempts to stop these flows where possible.
If Russia should thank any country more than others, it is Greece. It is here, in the quiet Greek gulf, that Russian oil is laundered with the help of brazen maneuvers. Here it is transshipped from one tanker to another, and then delivered to oil refineries around the world. Ultimately, some of this oil ends up back in the EU.
After “whitening” the origin of the oil, it can be imported into the EU without obstacles. No one knows or wants to know the truth. And those who are in the know either don’t care or make so much money that it just doesn’t matter.
Of particular concern is the threat of an oil spill. A large-scale accident could cause irreparable damage to hundreds or even thousands of kilometers of fragile coastline. This is the key conclusion of a large-scale investigation by journalists of the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung. A number of advanced OSINT techniques were used in the research process, which deserve special attention. This material examines those methods that may be particularly useful for journalists and researchers.
“They do these operations in international waters to avoid attention,” said Michel Wiese Bockmann, an analyst at Lloyds List, known for its maritime research. Bockmann and her team created a unique set of criteria to identify oil tankers that are under Russian control and belong to the so-called “shadow fleet”. As of early 2024, Lloyds tracked around 530 tankers worldwide that met their criteria. Their connection to Russia is not easy to detect, as these tankers are usually not directly owned by Russian companies. Instead, they are often registered to shell companies based abroad, such as in India.
According to Lloyds, approximately 12 percent of the world’s merchant fleet (or even more) is made up of “fog” vessels whose origin cannot be reliably linked to any particular country or company. The collected data clearly shows this trend: as the number of tankers, which Russia bought mostly from Greek shipping companies, increased, the number of vessels with unknown owners steadily increased.
On April 30, the oil tanker CLIO is on its way again. According to open data, the ship belongs to a German company from Hamburg. Since 2022, he has visited the Greek Gulf several times. Here he “met” with such tankers as ECO FLEET, which has often visited Russian oil ports since the beginning of the war.
An AIS tracking signal allows you to calculate who met whom. CLIO’s behavior informed ship trackers. There, he “met” several times with other tankers in the very place where the Russian shadow fleet operates.
In April 2023, the 16-year-old CLIO (IMO: 9396660) has just docked in the Greek Gulf of Laconia. He reportedly never crossed Greece’s economic zone line, the 12-mile demarcation zone. He remained here, in international waters, all the time. The meeting with the other tankers did not last long.
A large oil tanker docks with another vessel in the open sea, after which the process of pumping oil begins. This process can take anywhere from 12 to 24 hours, and sometimes even several days, depending on the volume of crude oil to be transferred. For additional safety, auxiliary vessels with so-called bumpers are often used between tankers to help avoid collisions. In the Laconian Gulf, this role was performed by Greek ships, ensuring the safe conduct of operations.
Overloading on the high seas can be a dangerous maneuver. Spills can happen all the time. This is one of the reasons why they are usually made at the port. But this is not an option for Russia. Transfers at sea STS should only be carried out by trained people and port authorities, says one expert.
In April, the 16-year-old CLIO just docked in Greece’s Laconian Gulf. It never crossed Greece’s economic zone line, the 12-mile demarcation zone. He remained here, in international waters, all the time. The meeting with the other tankers did not last long. The price of oil, which is often illegally traded above the sanctions cap, is $60 a barrel in December 2022.
In its statement, TB Marine Shipmanagement GmbH & Co. KG insists that it conducts its global operations in accordance with international laws and regulations and has been shown to comply with all current and new EU, US and UN sanctions regulations.
Since December 2022, the CLIO tanker, which is 250 meters long, has encountered other vessels at least six times in EU waters. Such encounters are not in themselves illegal, as there is no international law that prohibits such operations in open international waters.
These encounters might have gone unnoticed if the CLIO had not been part of a complex network of vessels numbering hundreds of tankers engaged in similar operations off the coast of Greece since the start of the war in Ukraine.
The analytics company, using AIS tracking data, compiled information on these meetings starting in December 2022. Gephi’s Open Graph Viz Platform software helped visualize the complex transshipment network, highlighting the scale and complexity of this activity.
Among the Russian shadow fleet are so-called base ships and support vessels. The bases resemble the main tankers, which are more common and come from Russia. Support vessels are sent to other ports around the world to deliver crude oil to refineries.
According to the data, the 17-year-old AGNES had the most frequent encounters with other tankers, with ZELDA (IMO: 9327372), tanker FOTUO and KOCATEPE being the most known partners. The latter, with registered owner KOCATEPE SHIPPING LTD, was allegedly involved in Russia’s illegal oil trade, Blacksea News reported. The 228 meter long AGNES is the backbone of this transshipment system.
Another vessel that repeatedly visited Laconic Bay is the oil tanker Aframax Turba, which was already reported by Bloomberg (LINK).
Until December 2023, the name Turba, now ROBON, also appears in the data of this investigation. She met the oil tanker TAKMA (IMO 9252333). Now 27 years old (built in 1997), the Turba is one of the oldest and most dangerous in Putin’s shadow fleet, and therefore poses a significant risk to the world’s oceans, experts say.
Accidents involving such old oil tankers are not uncommon. One example is the wreck of the Prestige, a 26-year-old oil tanker with unknown ownership that sailed from Russia and spilled 60,000 tons of crude oil off the coast of Spain in November 2002, polluting about 2,300 kilometers of coastline ( source ).
Tankers of the Russian shadow fleet have experienced unusual accidents. Last May, the Gabon-flagged tanker Pablo caught fire off the coast of Malaysia.
In October, the Turba encountered serious problems when its engine failed. The last technical inspection of this 243-meter long tanker took place in 2017. As a result, last October, without funding, the ship ran aground 300 kilometers off the coast of Indonesia and was no longer in use. This has become an unexpected problem for the Indonesian government.
In December, the authorities were forced to organize a rescue operation for the crew of the 23-year-old tanker. Experts believe that the Turba is an established part of the Russian shadow fleet. The data indicate that the tanker repeatedly encountered other vessels in the Laconian Gulf. Along with the Simba vessel, Turba used advanced GPS spoofing techniques to hide its location and smuggle oil, according to a Bloomberg investigation.
Like many tankers of the Russian shadow fleet, they have to sail through the Bosphorus. So-called shipspotters take videos or photos from land, record their existence and check AIS data. On September 23, 2023, the tanker Nargis (IMO 9353125) is heading to Laconic Gulf. Nargiz appears at least eight times in these STS broadcasts.
Like its companion, the oil tanker ATACAMA (IMO 9248801), the vessel was built by the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, allegedly a proxy firm for the Russian state to smuggle its crude oil to other markets. Unlike many other vessels, the Atacama did not switch from Gatik Ship Management to Caishan Ship Management in early 2023 before switching back to Unic, so the lloydslist report.
ATACAMA is not a sanctioned organization.Its presence in the Laconian Gulf STS transmits data—present at least 9 times—but is still deeply concerning. Especially because of possible connections with Europe. According to STS transfer data, he was allegedly insured at least once by Standard P&I Club on Charles Taylor & Co.
In Georgia, the ship caused outrage. The vessel attracted attention after it was spotted in the Black Sea port of Batumi, Georgia, the capital of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development Guram Guramishvili did not deny that the ship entered the port in 2022. However, the fact that the ship was under sanctions, he insisted, is not true, it is a misinformation spread by the media.
The ATACAMA ship is a prime example of a vessel belonging to the Russian shadow fleet, designed to participate in a large-scale scheme to circumvent oil sanctions. According to sources familiar with the shipping business, this vessel meets all the criteria.
This 176-meter tanker, built in 2003 by Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co. Ltd, has been in operation for a long time. During its service, it changed its flag several times and often shuttled between Greece and Russian ports, showing suspicious activity. AIS data and satellite imagery confirm its involvement in ship-to-ship oil transfers. Now at 21 years old, the ATACAMA is significantly older than the average oil tanker, which is typically around 12.9 years old, according to the FT report.
ATACAMA’s ownership history illustrates how the old ship ended up in the hands of the Kremlin. In 2022, the ship was owned by Marine Compass Inc. and managed by the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, which became known as a proxy company for Russian oil exporters.
Many of the ships formerly owned by Gatik have been resold and are now sailing under new flags. In August 2023, ATACAMA was reflagged and owned by Mumbai-based Marine Compass, while management was transferred to Turkish company Unic Tanker Gemi Isletmediligi AS. According to shipping records, the registered owner is now Felicia Seaways of Greece.
Early last year, the Turkish news site Cagdaskocaeli reported that an inspection team from the capital city of Kocaeli in northern Turkey found a vessel in the Gulf of Izmit that was allegedly polluting the sea. Images of the ATACAMA were published on the website and it was claimed that the vessel’s operator had been fined more than 30 million Turkish Liras (approximately €858,762).
Images show oil slicks spreading across the port platform and in the water shimmering on the surface.
The video is here: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8he6s9
Spoofing, the act of masking the AIS signal that ships use to ensure safety, is also said to have taken place. Spoofing involves deliberately changing the GPS transponder’s own signal, which makes it possible to hide the true location of the vessel.
In late September, Bloomberg released an analysis of the Turba tanker’s operations and showed how it managed to change its AIS signal during a ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfer operation.
Changing the AIS signal is not in itself illegal, but it violates the requirements of Annex 17 of the IMO Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), in particular section V/19.2.4, which requires vessels of between 300 and 500 tons to have on board AIS transponder and transmit the signal.
TankerTrackers co-founder Sam Madani classifies the actions of the Russian shadow fleet in the Laconian Gulf. According to him, spoofing has become a less frequent phenomenon, and in many cases this practice has decreased in Russia. However, spoofing is still actively used in the Black Sea. As for oil tankers, Madani notes that they are more likely to turn off the AIS signal altogether.
Checking whether a vessel is turning off AIS is quite simple – you need to compare data from tracking platforms with satellite images.
Analysis showed that satellite data often showed more tankers than AIS records predicted.
On February 9, 2024, a discrepancy was discovered between real-time data on the Vesselfinder tracking chart and satellite imagery. The map showed 16 large ships, while satellite images showed 26 vessels in the same area. There were approximately 10 pairs of vessels maneuvering in the bay.
The Greek tug Othello cruised between these pairs, moving slowly and approaching each group of vessels. AIS signals from Greek passenger ships also showed crew members moving from the port and back to Hytheio. Other Greek vessels did similar actions. This caused experts to suspect that the Greek authorities are aware of these transshipments and may be involved in illegal activities.
The MaritimeInsight report states that, as a general rule, vessels involved in ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfers must obtain permission from the relevant port government authorities to carry out such an operation.
TankerTrackers’ Sam Madani explained that normally tugs depart from the coast of Greece to surround pairs of vessels participating in STS with a boom line to collect spilled oil in the event of an accident. He also noted: “Had STS operations been carried out unattended in the Mediterranean, it would probably have immediately attracted the attention of Frontex and given rise to numerous liability cases.”
The shadow fleet consists mostly of old and poorly maintained tankers, which is no secret to those who pay attention to them. When Russian proxy companies acquired these tankers, their maintenance and inspections were often low-level, the sources said. Cost savings became common practice, resulting in careless maintenance of ships. Recent pictures taken of some of the tankers of the Russian Shadow Fleet show how some of them are badly painted, with the old names of the vessels still visible under the new coat of paint.
In April last year, Rolf Tore Roppestad, chief executive of Norway’s Gard, one of the largest ship insurers, warned that thousands of ships participating in STS maneuvers without adequate insurance cover were at risk. He warned in an interview with the Financial Times that a social and environmental disaster was just waiting to happen.
How high is the risk that something goes wrong during the STS transfer and it leads to an oil disaster? This is difficult to determine, but the potential for problems remains significant. This is especially true for vessels transshipping crude oil on the high seas rather than in port. Experts warn about the high risks of environmental pollution and the danger of fire. On the high seas, where ships are exposed to waves, wind and adverse weather conditions, even a small leak can have serious consequences.
In the event of an accident, the crew must be well prepared to respond. It is optimal if the vessel is equipped with fire extinguishing and oil spill fighting equipment. However, this requires investment in equipment and training, which is unlikely on older ships that are part of the shadow fleet.
Firefighting and oil spillage equipment should be present and the crew should be well trained to use it in emergency situations. & All guidance to be followed under Mepc 59, Marpol Annex 1 Chapter 8, Sopep, SMPEP, STS Transfer Manual and Operational Plan (link)
Tankers create noise that creates problems in the picturesque bay. Some species of protected animals live on the coast.
Cormac McGarry of ControlRisk explains that older tankers pose a high risk and potential accidents should be taken seriously.
The photos of the port in Githion show the emergency vessels that would intervene in the event of an oil disaster. The Greek authorities are obviously aware of the risk.
Petros Kokkalis, a representative of the left-wing forces in the European Parliament, submitted a request to the European Commission last October under the title “Dangerous operations in the Gulf of Laconia, a marine protection zone”.
According to his request, in the event of an oil spill, the protected area of Nature 2000 will be at risk. Data show that in the event of an accident of one tanker, several such areas will be affected. The oil spill could potentially affect at least 200 km of coastline. However, the consequences may be much greater, and a significant area will remain under the influence of an environmental disaster for many years.
Several Sentinel 2 satellite images show hints of streaks of oil on the water surface in the Persian Gulf.
As in Finland, the vessels of the Russian shadow fleet are not sufficiently insured. Experts say that in the event of an oil disaster, no one will know and will not be responsible for payment.
Alex Prezanti of State-Capture.org explains how to estimate the potential costs of oil spill cleanup.
“I can only provide a very rough estimate because the cost of an oil spill cleanup depends on many factors, including the size of the spill, the geographic location of the spill, the type of marine and coastal environment that will be affected, and the time and resources required for cleanup,” he explains. . In addition, there are additional costs associated with loss of biodiversity and long-term ecological consequences, so any estimates will mostly focus on clean-up costs.
In fact, there are few precedents for assessing such costs, and they are not always up-to-date. The two most relevant examples are the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the FSO Safer tanker operation. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, BP estimated the cleanup cost to be $61.6 billion for the 3.19 million barrels of oil that spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, at roughly $20,000 per barrel. A study commissioned by the UN into the potential oil spill from the FSO Safer tanker off the coast of Yemen estimated that the cleanup of the 1.1 million barrels of oil would cost US$20 billion, which is about US$18,000 per barrel.
The Russian shadow fleet consists of Afromax (750,000 barrels) and Suezmax (1 million barrels) tankers. It is estimated that the cleanup of the entire oil cargo from the Suezmax tanker could cost around US$19 billion, while the figure for the Afromax tanker is around US$14.2 billion. The final costs depend on the amount of oil actually transported, the extent of the spill and where it happened, he notes.
“I suspect that the Laconian Gulf cleanup operation will be expensive — given the relative cost of labor, the nature of the shoreline, and the known variable ocean currents.” — Alex Prezanti
The risk that these old vessels pose to the situation in Greece remains under-estimated and under-reported. Journalists often find it difficult to explain, beyond sanctions violations, the negative impact the shadow fleet has on the environment.
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